Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these results by means of simulations to study the effect of network structures on group's accuracy, and various aspects of the patterns of delegations that emerge in this type of interaction.
Introduction
Liquid democracy (Behrens et al., 2014) has been an influential proposal in the recent debate on democratic reforms, especially in Europe. Several grassroots campaigns, as well as local parties, experimented with this novel type of decision making procedure (e.g., Demoex 1 in Sweden, Piratenpartei 2 in Germany, and the Make Your Laws 3 campaign in the US). Liquid democracy is a form of proxy voting (Miller, 1969; Tullock, 1992; Alger, 2006; Green-Armytage, 2015; Cohensius et al., 2017) where, however-in contrast to classical proxy voting-proxies are delegable (or transitive, or transferable). Suppose we are voting on a binary issue, then each voter can either cast her vote directly, or she can delegate her vote to a proxy, who can again either vote directly or, in turn, delegate to yet another proxy, and so forth. Ultimately, the voters that decided not to delegate cast their ballots, which now carry the weight given by the number of voters who entrusted them as proxy, directly or indirectly.
Contribution The starting point of our analysis is an often cited feature of liquid democracy: transitive delegations reduce the level of duplicated effort required by direct voting, by freeing voters from the need to invest effort in order to vote accurately. The focus of the paper is the decision-making problem voters face between voting directly, thereby incurring a cost in terms of effort invested to learn about the issue at hand, or delegating to another voter in their network. We define a game-theoretic model-called delegation game-to represent this type of interaction. We establish pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence results for classes of delegation games, and study the quality of equilibria in terms of the average accuracy they enable for the population of voters, both analytically and through simulations. By means of simulations we also study the effects of different network structures on delegation games in terms of: performance against direct voting, average accuracy as well as accuracy of a majority, the number and quality of voters acting as ultimate proxies (so-called 'gurus') and, finally, the presence of delegation cycles. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper providing a comprehensive study of liquid democracy from a game-theoretic perspective.
Related work Although the idea of delegable proxy was already sketched by Dodgson (1884) , only a few very recent papers have studied aspects of liquid democracy from the perspective of (computational) social choice theory (Brandt et al., 2016) . Kling et al. (2015) provide an analysis of election data from the main platform implementing a liquid democracy voting system (Liquid Feedback 4 ) for the German Piratenpartei. They focus on network theoretic properties emerging from the structure of delegations-with particular attention to the number and influence of so-called gurus. Skowron et al. (2017) study an aspect of the Liquid Feedback platform concerning the order in which proposals are ranked and by which they are brought to the attention of the community. Boldi et al. (2011) investigate applications of variants of the liquid democracy voting method (called viscous democracy) to recommender systems. For a general, more philosophical discussion of liquid democracy, we refer the reader to (Blum & Zuber, 2015) .
More directly related to our investigations is the work by Christoff & Grossi (2017) and, especially, by Kahng et al. (2018) . The first paper studies liquid democracy as an aggregator-a function mapping profiles of binary opinions to a collective opinion-in the judgment aggregation and binary voting tradition (Grossi & Pigozzi, 2014; Endriss, 2016) . That paper's focus are the unintended effects that transferable proxies may have in terms of abstentions due to delegation cycles, and on the preservation of rationality constraints when voting on logically complex issues.
The second paper addresses one of the mostly cited selling arguments for liquid democracy: delegable proxies guarantee that better informed agents can exercise more weight on group decisions, thereby increasing their quality. Specifically, Kahng et al. (2018) study the level of accuracy that can be guaranteed by liquid democracy (based on vote delegation with weighted majority) vs. direct voting by majority. Their key result consists in showing that no 'local' procedure to select proxies can guarantee that liquid democracy is, at the same time, never (in large enough graphs) less accurate and sometimes strictly more accurate than direct voting. Unlike (Kahng et al., 2018) , we assume agents incur costs (effort) when voting directly, and on that basis we develop a game-theoretic model. Also, we assume agents aim at tracking their own type, rather than an external ground truth (although we assume the latter restriction in our simulations).
Preliminaries

Types and proximity
We are concerned with a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} having to decide whether x = 1 or x = 0. For each agent one of these two outcomes is better, but the agent is not necessarily aware which one. We refer to this hidden optimal outcome as the type of agent i and denote it by τ i ∈ {0, 1}. A deterministic type profile T = τ 1 , . . . , τ n collects each agent's type. We also consider probabilistic type profiles, where types are (not necessarily independent) random variables drawn according to a distribution P.
Given a probabilistic type profile, we define the proximity p i,j of two agents i, j ∈ N as the likelihood that they have the same type, i.e., p i,j = P(τ (i) = τ (j)). In a deterministic type profile, we set p i,j = 1 if τ i = τ j and p i,j = 0 otherwise.
Interaction structure
We assume agents are nodes in an underlying network represented by a binary relation R ⊆ N 2 . For i ∈ N the neighborhood of i in N, R is denoted R(i), i.e., the agents that are directly connected to i. Further let R * ⊆ N 2 be defined as the reflexive and transitive closure of R, i.e., (i, j) ∈ R if and only if there is a path in R from i to j, meaning that the network consist of a single connected component.
In our model we assume that agents can only observe and interact with their direct network neighbors. As a result, structural properties of the interaction network may play a role in the model dynamics. In our simulations we will consider four typical network structures that are well represented in the literature on social network analysis (cf. (Jackson, 2008) ): 1) the random network, in which each pair of nodes has a given probability of being connected (Erdös & Rényi, 1959) ; 2) the regular network, in which all nodes have the same degree; 3) the small world network, which features a small average path length and high clustering (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) ; and 4) the scale free network, which exhibits a power law degree distribution (Barabási & Albert, 1999 ).
Individual accuracy and delegation
Agents have the choice of either voting themselves or delegating to an agent in their neighborhood. Agents that vote themselves have to rely on their ability to judge the available alternatives, i.e., their ability to determine their own type. This is captured by the accuracy q i of an agent i: q i determines the likelihood that-if i decides to vote herself-she votes according to her type τ i . We assume that an agent's accuracy is always ≥ 0.5, i.e., at least as good as a coin toss.
A delegation profile is a vector d = d 1 , . . . , d n ∈ N n . Given a delegation profile d we denote by d i the proxy selected by i in d. Clearly a delegation profile can be viewed as a functional graph on N or, equivalently, as a map in d : N → N where d(i) = d i . When the iterated application of d from i reaches a fixpoint we denote such fixpoint as d * i and call it i's guru (in d). In the following, we write N * to denote the set of voters whose delegation does not end in a cycle, i.e., the set of voters i for which d * i exists. We write d ′ = (d −i , j) as a short form for d ′ = d 1 , . . . , d i−1 , j, d i+1 , . . . , d n .
A Model of Rational Delegations
Individual accuracy under delegable proxy
Each agent i has to choose between two options: either to vote themselves with accuracy q i or to delegate, thereby inheriting the accuracy of another voter (unless i is involved in a delegation cycle). These choices are recorded in the delegation profile d and can be used to compute the individual accuracy for each agent i ∈ N * as follows:
(1)
That is, we make the assumption that if i lies on a delegation cycle in profile d, then i's accuracy equals that of a fair coin toss. Otherwise, i's accuracy equals the likelihood that i's guru has the same type and votes accurately plus the likelihood that i's guru has the opposite type and fails to vote accurately. Note that if i does not delegate, i.e., d i = i, then q * i (d) = q i . In a deterministic type profile (p i,j ∈ {0, 1}), the accuracy of a voter reduces to
Let us immediately establish a basic fact about delegations in our model: assuming a weak rationality condition for all agents, an agent can identify some delegations that have a guaranteed positive impact on her accuracy, even if her proxy further delegates to agents she has no information about. We say that a delegation profile d is positive if for all j ∈ N either d j = j or q * j (d) > q j . Furthermore, we say that a delegation from i to a neighbor j is locally positive
Proposition 1. Let d be a positive delegation profile. Further, let s, t ∈ N , d s = s, and d ′ = (d −s , t), i.e., agent s has not delegated yet but considers to delegate to t. If a delegation from s to t is locally positive, then q * s (d ′ ) > q * s (d) = q s and hence d ′ is positive.
Proof. Let d t = r. Since d is positive, we know that q * t (d) = q r ·p t,r +(1−q r )·(1−p t,r ) > q t . Furthermore, we use the fact that p s,r = P(τ (s) = τ (r)) = p s,t p t,r + (1 − p s,t )(1 − p t,r ). and obtain
We see that q * s (d ′ ) > q s and hence d ′ is positive.
Observe however that locally positive delegations do not necessarily correspond to optimal delegation decisions. This can be easily seen in an example where agent i is not a neighbor of a very competent agent j, but would have to delegate via an intermediate agent k (who delegates to j). If this intermediate agent k has a smaller accuracy than i, then the delegation from i to k would not be locally positive, even though it is an optimal choice.
Delegation Games
In delegation games, each agent i has to invest an effort e i to manifest his accuracy q i . If he delegates, he does not have to spend effort. We assume that agents aim at maximizing the trade-off between the accuracy they can achieve (either by voting directly or through proxy) and the effort they spend. Under this assumption, the binary decision set-up with delegable proxy we outlined above can be used to define a natural game -called delegation game -G = N, P, R, Σ i , u i , with i ∈ N , where N is the set of agents, P is the (possibly degenerate) distribution from which the types of the agents in N are drawn, R the underlying network as defined above, Σ i ∈ N is the set of strategies of agent i (that is, the choice of a proxy or of casting a ballot), and
is agent i's utility function. The utility i extracts from a delegation profile equals the accuracy he inherits through proxy or, if he votes, his accuracy minus the effort spent.
For delegation games, we always assume that q i −e i ≥ 0.5 for all i ∈ N . This is justified by our definition of utility: if q i −e i < 0.5, then i would prefer to choose randomly, without effort, over taking an actual decision, with effort.
The following classes of delegation games will be used in the paper: games with deterministic profiles, i.e., where P is degenerate and all players are assigned a crisp type from {0, 1}; homogeneous games, where all players have the same (deterministic) type; 5 effortless voting games, where for each i ∈ N we have e i = 0.
As an example, a homogeneous game in matrix form is given in Table 1 , where N = {1, 2}, R = N 2 and the distribution yielding the deterministic type profile T = 1, 1 . Interestingly, if we assume that q i − e i > 0.5 with i ∈ {1, 2}, and that 6 q −i > q i − e i (that is the opponent's accuracy is higher than the player's individual accuracy minus its effort), then the game shares the ordinal preference structure of the class of coordination games (cf., (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) ): players need to coordinate on who votes and who delegates, with two non-coordination outcomes, i.e., both players voting, or both delegating, of which the second (i.e., the delegation cycle) is worst for both players. Notice that, were the underlying network not complete (that is, R ⊂ N 2 ), the matrix would be shrunk by removing the rows and columns corresponding to the delegation options no longer available.
The introduction of effort has significant consequences on the delegation behavior of voters, and we will study it in depth in the coming sections. It is worth noting immediately that the assumptions of Proposition 1 no longer apply, since agents may prefer to make delegations that are not locally positive due to the decreased utility of voting directly.
Existence of Equilibria in Delegation Games
In this section we study the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria (NE) in two classes of delegation games.
Deterministic Types
In the following we provide a NE existence result for games with deterministic type profiles. vote delegate (to 1) vote q 1 − e 1 , q 2 − e 2 q 1 − e 1 , q 1 delegate (to 2) q 2 , q 2 − e 2 0.5, 0.5 Table 1 : A two players delegation game. The row player is agent 1 and the column player is agent 2.
Theorem 1. Delegation games with deterministic profiles always have a (pure strategy) NE.
Proof. First of all, observe that since the profile is deterministic, for each pair of agents i and j, p i,j ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, accuracies of voters follow from Equation (2). The proof is by construction. First, we partition the set of agents
We consider these two sets separately; without loss of generality let us consider N 1 . Further we consider the network
Since (N 1 , R 1 ) can be seen as a directed graph, we can partition it into strongly connected components (SSC). If we shrink each SSC into a single vertex, we obtain the condensation of this graph; note that such a graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). We construct a delegation profile d by traversing this DAG bottom up, i.e., starting with leave SSCs. Let S ⊆ N 1 be a set of agents corresponding to a leave SSC in the condensation DAG. We choose an agent i in S that has maximum q i − e i . Everyone in S (including i) delegates to i. Now let S ⊆ N 1 be a set of agents corresponding to an inner node SSC in the condensation DAG and assume that we have already defined the delegation for all SSCs that can be reached from S. As before, we identify an agent i ∈ S with maximum q i − e i . Further, let T ⊆ N 1 \ S be the set of all voters j that can be be reached from S in (N 1 , R 1 ), and for which q * j > q i −e i . We distinguish two cases. (i) If T = ∅, then we choose an agent k ∈ T with q k = max j∈T q j and all agents in S directly or indirectly delegate to k. (ii) If T = ∅, all agents in S delegate to i. This concludes our construction (as for N 0 the analogous construction applies); let d be the corresponding delegation profile.
It remains to verify that this is indeed a NE: Let i be some agent in an SSC S, and, without loss of generality, let i ∈ N 1 . Observe that since we have a deterministic profile, if agent i changes her delegation to j, then i's utility changes to q * j (d) if i ∈ N 1 and 1 − q * j (d) if i ∈ N 0 . First, note that for all agents k ∈ N , q * k (d) ≥ q k − e k ≥ 0.5. Hence, we can immediately exclude that for agent i delegating to an agent in j ∈ N 0 is (strictly) beneficial, as it would yield an accuracy of at most 1 − q * j ≤ 0.5. Towards a contradiction assume there is a beneficial deviation to an agent j ∈ N 1 , i.e., there is an
Let us now consider the three cases:
In case (1), everyone in S delegates to i. Hence, if j ∈ S, a cycle would occur yielding a utility of 0.5, which is not sufficient for a beneficial deviation. If a delegation to j / ∈ S is possible but was not chosen, then by construction q * j < q i − e i and hence this deviation is not beneficial. We conclude that in case (1) such an agent j cannot exist. In case (2), everyone in S delegates to d * i . Hence, if j ∈ S, then d * j = d * i , a contradiction. If j / ∈ S, the same reasoning as before applies and hence also here we obtain a contradiction. In case (3), by construction, d * i / ∈ S had been chosen to maximise accuracy, hence j ∈ S. Since for all k ∈ S, d * k = d * i , only a deviation to i itself can be beneficial, i.e., j = i. However, since d * i was chosen because q * d * (i) > q i − e i , no beneficial deviation is possible. We have indeed constructed a NE.
By the construction in the proof we obtain as corollary that NE in delegation games with deterministic profiles can be found in polynomial time.
Effortless Voting
The assumption of effortless voting (e i = 0 for all i ∈ N ) is applicable to situations where effort has to be spent in advance of the decision and can no longer be changed during the delegation game.
Theorem 2. Delegation games with effortless voting always have a (pure strategy) NE.
Proof. We prove this statement by showing that the following procedure obtains a NE: We start with a strategy profile in which no player delegates, i.e., player i's strategy is i. Then, we iteratively allow players to choose their individual best response strategy to the current strategy profile. Players act sequentially in arbitrary order. If there are no more players that can improve their utility by changing their strategy, we have found a NE. In the following we will show that such a convergence indeed occurs.
First, we will now show by induction that a best response that increases the player's utility never decreases the utility of other players. Assume that all previous best responses have not reduced any players' utility. Assume player i now chooses a best response that increases i's utility. Let d be the delegation profile; further, let d * i = s. By assumption, i's utility started with q i − e i = q i and has not decreased since, i.e., u i (d) ≥ q i . Since i's best response strictly increases i's utility, it cannot be a delegation to herself. So let a delegation to j be i's best response. We define d ′ = (d −i , j), the delegation profile. Further, let d * j = t, i.e., i now delegates to j and by transitivity to t, i.e., d ′ * i = d ′ * j = t. Let k be some player other than i. We define the delegation path of k as the sequence (d(k), d(d(k)), d (d(d(k) )), . . . ). If k's delegation path does not contain i, then k's utility remains unchanged, i.e., u k (d ′ ) ≥ u k (d). If k's delegation path contains i, then k now delegates by transitivity to t, i.e., we have d * k = s and d ′ * k = t. By Equation (3), we have u k (d) = q s · p k,s + (1 − q s ) · (1 − p k,s ) and (4)
We have to show that u k (d ′ ) ≥ u k (d). Since i chooses a best response, it holds that
In the following we will often use the fact that, for a, b ∈ [0, 1], if ab + (1 − a)(1 − b) ≥ 0.5, then either a, b ∈ [0, 0.5] or a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]. Since accuracies are always at least 0.5, it holds that u i (d) ≥ q i ≥ 0.5 and by Equation (6) we have q s · p i,s + (1 − q s ) · (1 − p i,s ) ≥ 0.5 and hence p i,s ≥ 0.5. Analogously, Equation (4) implies that p k,s ≥ 0.5. Since
it is straightforward to see that also p k,i ≥ 0.5. Now by substituting p k,s = p k,i · p i,s + (1 − p k,i )(1 − p i,s ), in Equation (4), we obtain
and u k (d) ≥ (2p k,i − 1) · u i (d).
Furthermore, by substituting p k,t = p k,i · p i,t + (1 − p k,i )(1 − p i,t ), we obtain
Since p k,i ≥ 0.5 and hence (2p k,i − 1) ≥ 0, the fact that u i (d ′ ) > u i (d) (player i chose a best response that increased her utility) together with Equations (9) and (10) imply that u k (d ′ ) > u k (d). We have shown that if some player chooses a best response, the utility of other players does not decrease.
To complete the proof, observe that there is only a finite number of utilities that players can obtain. As a best response strictly increases the utility of the acting player and all other utilities do not decrease, we can infer that our procedure converges and a NE exists.
Like in the case of deterministic profiles, our proof yields as corollary that, in delegation games with effortless voting, NE can be found in polynomial time.
The general case
The existence of NE in general delegation games remains an interesting open problem. It should be noted that the proof strategies of both Theorems 1 and 2 do not work in the general case. Without a clear dichotomy of type it is not possible to assign delegations for all agents in an SSC (as we do in the proof of Theorem 1). And the key property upon which the proof of Theorem hinges (that a best response of an agent does not decrease the utility of other agents) fails in the general case due to the presence of non-zero effort.
Quality of Equilibria in Delegation Games
In delegation games players are motivated to maximize the tradeoff between the accuracy they acquire and the effort they spend for it. A natural measure for the quality of a delegation profile is, therefore, how accurate or informed a random voter becomes as a result of the delegations in the profile, that is, the average accuracy (i.e.,q * (d) = 1 n i∈N q * i (d)) players enjoy in that profile. Clearly average accuracy is directly related to utilitarian social welfare (i.e., SW(d) = i∈N u i (d)) in delegation games, as follows:
That is, average accuracy is average social welfare where effort of direct voters is 'reimbursed'.
It can immediately be noticed that equilibria do not necessarily maximize the quality of the group decision measured as average accuracy. On the contrary, in the following example NE yield an average accuracy of close to 0.5, whereas an average accuracy of almost 1 is achievable.
Example 1. Consider an n-player delegation game where all players have the same type and everybody is connected except for player 1, which cannot delegate to anyone; this is specified by the network R. Further, we have e 1 = 0 and e i = 0.5 − ǫ for i ≥ 2. The respective accuracies are q 1 = 0.5 + 2ǫ and q i = 1. If player i ≥ 2 does not delegate, its utility is 0.5 + ǫ. Hence, it is always more desirable to delegate to player 1 (which yields a utility of 0.5 + 2ǫ for i). Consider now the profiles in which all players delegate to player 1 (either directly or transitively). Player 1 can only vote directly (with utility 0.5 + 2ǫ). All such profiles are NE where we have an average accuracy of 0.5 + 2ǫ. If, however, some player j ≥ 2 chose to vote herself, all players (except 1) would delegate to j thereby obtaining an average accuracy of 1 − 0.5−2ǫ n , which converges to 1 for n → ∞. This is, however, not a NE, since j could increase her utility by delegating to 1. The findings of the example can be made more explicit by considering a variant of the price of anarchy for delegation games, based on the above notion of average accuracy. That is, for a given delegation game G, the price of anarchy (PoA) of G is given by
where NE(G) denotes the set of pure-strategy NE of G.
Fact 1. In delegation games, the PoA is bounded below by 1 and above by 2.
Proof. For the upper bound of 2, Example 1 shows that maximal average accuracy can be made arbitrarily close to 1, while the average accuracy of a worse NE can be made arbitrarily close to 0.5. For the lower bound of 1 it suffices to consider any delegation game were R = ∅ (that is, no delegation is possible).
An informative performance metrics for the study of liquid democracy is the difference between the group accuracy after delegations have occured and the group accuracy achieved by direct voting. This measure, called gain, was introduced and studied in (Kahng et al., 2018) . Here we adapt it to our game-theoretic setting as follows: G(G) = min d∈NE(G)q * (d) −q whereq =q * ( 1, . . . , n ). That is, the gain in the delegation game G is the average accuracy of the worse NE minus the average accuracy of the status quo, that is, the profile in which no voter delegates.
Fact 2. In delegation games, gain G is bounded below by −0.5 and above by 0.5.
Proof. For the lower bound we can use again Example 1, where the average accuracy of the worse NE can be made arbitrarily close to 0.5, and the average accuracy of direct voting (which given the structure of the example is maximized by direct voting) can be made arbitrarily close to 1. For the upper bound, consider an effortless homogeneous game where q 1 = 1, and q i = 0.5 + ǫ for any i = 1 in N . Assume furthermore that R is such that any agent can delegate only to 1. In such a game, the average accuracy of the unique NE is 1, while the average accuracy of direct voting can be made arbitrarily close to 0.5. We thereby obtain the desired bound of 0.5.
The above bounds for PoA and gain provide only a very partial picture of the performance of liquid democracy when modeled as a delegation game. By means of simulations the next section will provide a more fine-grained perspective on the effects of delegations in liquid democracy.
Simulations
We simulate the delegation game of Section 3.2 in a variety of settings. We restrict ourselves to homogeneous games, in which all agents share the same type. This allows us to relate our results to those of Kahng et al. (2018) .
Setup
We generate graphs of size N = 250 of each of the four topologies random, regular, small world, and scale free, for different average degrees, while ensuring that the graph is connected and thus all nodes are in R * . Agents are randomly initialized with individual accuracy and effort, q i , e i ∈ [0.5, 1], with q i − e i ≥ 0.5. We average results over 2500 simulations for each setting (25 randomly generated graphs × 100 initializations). Agents can correctly observe their own accuracy and effort as well as the accuracy q j of their neighbours. Due to our assumptions all proximities are 1. Each agent i selects from her neighbourhood R(i) (which includes i herself) the agent j that maximizes her expected utility, as in Equation 3. We compare two scenarios. The iterated best response scenario follows the procedure of the proof of Theorem 2, in which agents sequentially update their proxy to best-respond to the current profile d using knowledge of their neighbors' accuracy q * i (d). In the one-shot game scenario all agents choose their proxy simultaneously based only on the initial accuracies in their neighborhood.
Iterated best response dynamics
These experiments complement the existence theorems of Section 3.3. In the effortless setting, for which convergence was established analytically, the experiments offer insight into the effects of network structures. In the setting with effort, for which convergence was left as open question, the experiments allow us to still draw some conclusions about properties of equilibrium states.
We initialize q i ∼ N (0.75, 0.05) and first investigate the case in which e i = 0 for all i (effortless voting). Across all combinations of network type and average degrees ranging from 4 to 24, we find that the best response dynamics converge optimally with d * i = arg max j∈R(i) q j for all i, as predicted by Theorem 2. We observe minimal differences between network types, but see a clear inverse relation between average degree and the number of iterations required to converge (Figure 1) . Intuitively, more densely connected networks allow agents to identify their optimal proxies more easily.
The larger differences between the required number of best response updates for lower degree graphs of different types (e.g. degree 4) coincide with differences between the mean distance between nodes in those graphs: a shorter average distance yields a lower number of best response updates (Table 2) . Intuitively this makes sense, as larger distances between nodes mean longer delegation chains. However, we have not yet conducted statistical tests to verify this hypothesis formally.
We accumulate results across all network types and compare the effortless setting to the case in which effort is taken into account. When we include effort e i ∼ N (0.025, 0.01), we still observe convergence in all cases and, interestingly, the number of iterations required does not change significantly (Table 3) . Although the process no longer results in an optimal equilibrium, each case still yields a single guru j with q j ≈ max k q k (less than 1% error). In this scenario, the inclusion of effort means that a best response update of agent i no longer guarantees non-decreasing accuracy and utility for all other agents. This effect becomes stronger as the average network degree increases, and as a result higher degree networks allow a greater discrepancy between the maximal average accuracy achievable and the average accuracy obtained at stabilization (Table 4 ). 
One-shot delegation game
Here we study one-shot interaction in a delegation game: all agents select their proxy (possibly themselves) simultaneously among their neighbors; no further response is possible. While Kahng et al. (2018) study a probabilistic model, we instead assume that agents deterministically select as proxy the agent j ∈ R(i) that maximizes their utility, as above.
We compareq andq * (the average network accuracy without and with delegation, respectively), as well as the probability of a correct majority vote under both direct democracy P D and liquid democracy P L where gurus carry as weight the number of agents for whom they act as proxy. The difference P L − P D is the notion of gain (Kahng et al., 2018) . Cf. Condorcet's jury theorem (Grofman et al., 1983 ) P D → 1 as N → ∞, and indeed for N = 250 we obtain P D ≈ 1. First we again look at the effortless setting. Figure 2 (top) shows both metrics for the four different network types and for different average degrees. We observe that whilē q * (d) increases as the network degree increases (and in fact is always higher thanq without delegation), the probability of a correct majority outcome, P L , simultaneously decreases. This confirms the analysis of Kahng et al. (2018) . We also observe that the number of gurus decreases exponentially as the degree increases (Figure 3, left) . Simply put, giving all voting weight to a small group of gurus increases the chance of an incorrect majority vote, assuming that gurus have a less than perfect accuracy.
When we include effort, shown in Figure 2 (bottom), we observe a drastic decrease in average network accuracy combined with a lower probability of a correct majority outcome under liquid democracy, with both decreasing as network degree increases. The main reason is the existence of delegation cycles in this case. This contrasts the best response setting above where agents could iteratively reconsider their choice of proxy and thus avoid cycles. Now, even with relatively low effort (mean 0.025), up to half of all agents are stuck in a cycle (and thereby cast a random vote by our model) when degree increases. This confirms results on the probability of delegation cycles from (Christoff & Grossi, 2017) and stresses the importance of cycle resolution in concrete implementations of liquid democracy such as Liquid Feedback. Finally, Figure 2 highlights differences between the four network types. Scale free networks yield a lower probability of a correct majority outcome across all degrees, as well as a larger number of gurus with a lower average accuracy and longer delegation chains (Figure 3, right) . Intuitively, this indicates that one-shot interaction in scale free networks is more likely to end up in a local optimum. In contrast, small world networks have short average distances between nodes, and thus agents are more likely to be close to their optimal guru.
Conclusions and future work
This paper introduces delegation games as a first game-theoretic model of liquid democracy. Both our theoretical and experimental results show that voting effort is a key ingredient for understanding how delegations form and what their effects are. Our empirical findings provide additional insights into the influence of structural properties of the interaction network on the quality of collective decisions in liquid democracy.
We mention two of many natural directions for future research. A general NE existence theorem is the main open question. Refining the utility function of our games, by incorporating the outcome of a voting rule (e.g., majority), would enable richer strategic behavior by agents, thereby leading to more insights into decision-making in liquid democracy. and Y698. Davide Grossi acknowledges support for this research by EPSRC under grant EP/M015815/1. Daan Bloembergen has received funding through the ERA-Net Smart Grids Plus project Grid-Friends, with support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme.
